Shock, Stimulus, and Upheaval: The Great Recession, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and Mayoral Coalitions in Brooklyn, NY 2009–2013 by Linsmeier, Charles
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
2-2020 
Shock, Stimulus, and Upheaval: The Great Recession, The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and Mayoral Coalitions 
in Brooklyn, NY 2009–2013 
Charles Linsmeier 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3558 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 















SHOCK, STIMULUS, & UPHEAVAL:  
THE GREAT RECESSION, THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT,  












A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment 
















































CHARLES W. LINSMEIER 
 






SHOCK, STIMULUS, & UPHEAVAL:  
THE GREAT RECESSION, THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT,  









This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in 






______________________     ____________________________ 
Date        John Mollenkopf 
 





______________________     ____________________________ 
Date        Alyson Cole 
 

















SHOCK, STIMULUS, & UPHEAVAL:  
THE GREAT RECESSION, THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT,  




CHARLES W. LINSMEIER 
 
 




In 2009, the United States, and much of the world, experienced the largest economic 
decline since the Great Depression of the early 20th Century. New York City, the financial 
capital of the United States, was not immune. In early 2009, the federal government passed 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) shepherding a substantial 
infusion of federal funds to states and municipalities to stimulate local economies and stem 
the tide of potential job losses. At the same time, New York City was experiencing an 
historic mayoral election - the potential third term of Mayor Michael Bloomberg - made 
possible only by an eleventh hour vote by the City Council to extend term limits for the city 
council and mayor’s office beyond the two-term limit established by public referendum.  
In 2009, these two historic events collided, a mayor seeking to maintain his political 
coalition under threat, and the allocation of a large influx of federal funds across the city. 
This study examines how federal funding available from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act was allocated with respect to the forging of political coalitions during the 
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mayoral election of 2009. Specifically, it focuses on the hotly-contested borough of Brooklyn 
and investigates the potential for political maneuvering of federal funds towards key 
constituencies within the dominant political coalition. The study looks not only at the 2009 
election year, but explores changes in the pattern of federal funding as political coalitions 
shifted in Brooklyn during the third term of the Bloomberg administration, contributing to 
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In early 2009, the federal government passed the American Recovery & 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA): legislation designed to stimulate the nation’s economy during the 
largest economic recession in nearly a century. The collapse of national and international 
global financial institutions predicated by the failure of the mortgage-lending industry 
resulted in a freefall in local tax revenue, the removal of credit sources for municipalities 
and private loan-seekers, and a dramatic fall in consumer confidence. For a period of 
months, the most powerful economy was at a standstill including many sectors threatened 
to the point of permanent stagnation. The financial sector, once the prize of the U.S. 
economy, and many manufacturing sectors, including the long-suffering auto industry, 
turned to the federal government for a bailout. At the same time, the new Obama 
administration attempted to revitalize local economies by passing stimulus legislation in 
support of small business owners, local municipalities and state governments, and private 
sector industry most threatened by the collapse. 
 Communities across the United States were suffering: Midwestern cities like Detroit, 
Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee saw the bottom fall out of a manufacturing industry already in 
rapid decline; Western cities like Denver, Las Vegas, and Phoenix suffered greatest from the 
housing collapse with foreclosures at the highest rates in the country, each having long 
supported city growth on the back of the housing boom. New York City, the geographical 
epicenter of the financial sector, witnessed unforeseen shortfalls in revenue from the 
financial industry and a shutter of investment in the city. Large scale projects ceased to be 
explored, or were indefinitely halted, and foreclosure rates increased in a city whose 
principle builders and owners operate multi-family homes. Other shortfalls in the funding of 




 In the same year, New York City residents went to the polls to elect candidates to 
the citywide offices of mayor, comptroller, and public advocate. The City Council was also 
up for reelection. In late October of 2008, as the early experiences of the Recession were 
taking hold, the City Council passed 29 to 22 – and the sitting mayor, Michael Bloomberg, 
signed – new legislation extending the city council and mayor’s term limits to three 4-year 
terms in office. The contentious move was largely viewed by opponents as a purely 
politically maneuver to circumvent the rights of the city’s residents to determine local 
limitations of power; indeed, on two separate occasions the city’s residents had voted in 
citywide referendums to limit the terms of city officials to two.  
The term-limit legislation instantaneously changed the political dynamics in the 
upcoming election with the popular mayor Michael Bloomberg, a Manhattan Democrat-
turned-Republican-turned-Independent now running for a third term. Over the coming 
months, a number of high-profile challengers removed themselves from the race, and 
William Thompson, the city’s serving comptroller, emerged as the Democratic nominee. In 
addition to the citywide races, city council seats held by council members who had voted for 
the extension of term-limits came under fire with a series of primary challenges. 
This tumultuous debate around the extension of the city’s term limits, against the 
backdrop of the economic recession, developed from an evolution of urban power in political 
and economic forces in New York City that dated back to the late 1970s with the first 
electoral victory by Edward Koch. The rise of the Koch administration served as the first 
instance of the post-industrial regime taking power in New York City, a regime of influence 
and electoral success that stretched over three decades and 28+ years of mayoral control. 
The success of the “pro-growth, post-industrial,” regime of white ethnics from Brooklyn, 
Queens, and Staten Island aligned with the Manhattan small business and corporate 
interests produced a winning and largely internally consistent regime of influence in the city 
(Mollenkopf, 1994). This regime faced off election after election against the community-
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based Democratic organizations that once dominated city politics but appeared ever-
fractured by ethnic heterogeneity, class differences, and political infighting.  
Following ARRA money in the context of the 2009 election provides a novel view into 
the dynamics of urban regime politics. As Irene Rubin writes in The Politics of Public 
Budgeting, “public budgeting is not only a technical process, it is also necessarily and 
appropriately political.” Budgets reflect choices about what governments will and will not 
do; they reflect priorities. And, ultimately, “budgetary decision-making provides a picture of 
the relative power of budget actors within and between branches of government as well as 
of the importance of citizens, interest groups, and political parties” (Rubin, 2019). Through 
federal documentation of released funds, ARRA money can be tracked to the various urban 
constituencies that form the competing political interests in the city. All constituencies could 
compete for ARRA funding, but the type of funding, the direction of funding towards certain 
constituencies, and the role of that funding within communities plays into the broader 
themes of urban regime politics in New York City, particularly in the borough of Brooklyn. 
The following analysis of these funding trends maps over the urban constituencies that 
formed behind the mayor’s and the Democratic Party’s efforts to create constituencies large 
enough to win contested elections. 
ARRA funding provides a particularly useful measure of political and policy dynamics 
because the federal stimulus was unanticipated as part of the original FY 2010 estimates by 
the Mayor or Comptroller’s Office. In addition, the total “federal stimulus” from the Obama 
administration was unprecedented in recent times, in terms of its overall funding levels, 
$787 billion, and its focus on filling the coffers of state and local budgets swamped during 
the Recession, and replacing drops in private investment with a one-time injection of public 
investment in “shovel-ready” projects. The effect on New York City was not small. The 
FY2010 budget summary by Comptroller William Thompson in 2009 estimated total 
revenues for NYC of $61.211 billion with an estimated $5.313 billion coming from federal 
sources (8.7%). After the influx of funding from the federal government through ARRA and 
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other sources, the FY2010 budget was later confirmed at $63.080 billion with an estimated 
$7.943 billion (12.6%) coming from the federal government, a 49.5% increase in federal 
funding (Thompson, 2008; Liu, 2010; Stringer, 2017). An analysis of the allocation and 
disbursement of federal funding that exceeded projections by $2.63 billion provides a 
unique opportunity to see how politics and political coalitions influence or fail to influence 
the opportunities to shelter federal funds that support their political constituencies. 
This paper will attempt to answer four questions around the use of federal funds in 
Brooklyn from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and its relationship to political 
events occurring in the upheaval from a mayoral election on the eve of the largest recession 
since the Great Depression, and at a unique political moment in a generation of New York 
City politics. The questions this study seeks to answer: (1) What businesses, organizations, 
or individuals received federal stimulus funds as part of ARRA? (2) Were those recipients 
unique to funding from ARRA or were they recipients of discretionary funding from the City 
of New York in years after the distribution of ARRA funds? (3) Were the recipients of funds 
from ARRA aligned to political coalitions that reelected the mayor in a tight 2009 reelection 
bid? (4) To what degree can we determine measures of success for the ARRA 
implementation in Brooklyn against the original policy goals announced as part of the ARRA 
legislation? 
 
Review of ARRA 2009 program goals and research literature 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) has been a focus of research 
ever since the bill passed and was signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009, just 
weeks into his administration. The bill, when passed, introduced a stimulus of approximately 
$787 billion to support federal, state, and local initiatives to stimulate the economy. As 
noted by Hall & Jennings (2010), “the act was heralded as a direct response to the ongoing 
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and deepening economic crisis. ARRA had three primary goals (originally from 
recovery.gov): 
 
1. Create new jobs and save existing ones 
2. Spur economic activity and invest in long-term growth 
3. Foster unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in government 
spending. 
 
Though accountability and transparency were a key objective, as originally reported on 
recovery.gov, ARRA included several additional goals that were not as effectively reported 
or tracked. The act states five general purposes: 
 
1. To preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery.  
2. To assist those most affected by the recession. 
3. To provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency by spurring 
technological advances in science and health. 
4. To invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that 
will provide long-term economic benefits.  
5. To stabilize state and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid 
reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax increases.  
 
Up until the future demise of the recovery.gov website, the data made available on 
recovery.gov considered only the first of these purposes and excluded the remaining four 
(Hall & Jennings, 2010). Much of the state and local budget support was not tracked 
effectively, despite it representing one-third of the total ARRA spending. Nonetheless, 
recovery.gov and its successor USAspending.gov, provide insight into payments to 
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individuals, businesses, and organizations throughout the United States, including loan and 
grant information on every recipient.  
Despite the efforts at transparency, the distribution of ARRA funds faced other 
constraints, both operational and structural. Research has demonstrated that the ARRA 
funding faced implementation challenges, specifically with regards to staff capacity, legal 
constraints, wage requirements, transparency requirements, and shovel-ready status 
(Carley & Hyman, 2014). Nancy Johnson (2009) surveyed local administrators uncovering 
“the reality has been that most of the funds are being transmitted through preexisting 
federal programs that have a minimal effect on the day-to-day services provided by cities. 
As such, cities have shifted their ARRA funding strategies away from seeking funds for a 
prioritized list of needs to applying for any grant for which they might be deemed eligible.”  
Since its implementation, researchers have looked at the role of politics in the 
distribution of federal funds under ARRA and the potential of influence from political 
coalitions aligned with the parties in power. John Kingdon famously noted that policy 
happens at a particular moment in time under the confluence of three conditions: a problem 
widely perceived by the public, the existence of ready-at-hand policy or sets of policies and, 
finally, a favorable political environment (Kingdon, 1995). The financial crisis of 2008 
provided the economic and political catalyst for parties in power to distribute an 
unprecedented amount of federal funds to recipients across the country. The question then 
to ask: Did they?  
Political coalition theory suggests that existent coalitions at the confluence of events 
recognized by Kingdon’s thesis have distributive power to support their coalition or weaken 
their opponents. As noted by Mollenkopf (1989), “urban governments have powers and 
interests of their own, not fully subordinate to economic interests, and proposes that the 
concept of a “dominant political coalition” offers the best way to understand how urban 
political orders are developed, sustained, and at times undermined or overturned. Dominant 
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coalitions achieve the ability to direct governmental power on an ongoing basis over a range 
of issues.”  
Nonetheless, research on whether distribution of ARRA funds were political motivated 
are inconclusive. At the national level, there were indications that the allocation process was 
unaltered, as one study noted, “By all accounts, ARRA’s implementation by the CDFI 
(Community Development Financial Institutions) Fund was uneventful. Federal managers 
worked diligently to allocate the additional tax credit authority to the community 
development entities (CDEs) eligible to receive tax credit allocations under the program” 
(Benjamin, 2017; Conlan, 2017). Yet, as funds gated for distribution at the state and local 
level moved forward, early signs of political maneuvering entered the fray, “States with 
Republican governors were nearly 60% less likely to certify the ARRA on a given day than 
states with Democratic governors.” Or, perhaps not unexpectedly, “When economic 
constraints and policy design foreclose actual rejection of a federal law, state policymakers 
may rely on party labels to register their approbation or disapprobation through other 
means, including the amount of time taken to accept federal funding” (Miller, 2012). 
Political procrastination was not the only tool in the allocation process, “although seemingly 
universalistic, the distribution of funds under ARRA was not flat, and some counties received 
substantially more than others. One [alternative] theory, is that geographic distribution may 
be driven by policy window effects, particularly for sweeping policies like ARRA. A reason 
that ARRA did not direct resources toward the hardest-hit areas may be that the legislation 
became a vehicle for a broad array of other policy goals as political entrepreneurs took 
advantage of an especially wide-open window of opportunity” (Gimpel, 2012). Furthering 
that perception, “there does appear to be a distinct tilt toward counties that were stronger 
for the Democratic Party in 2008. All else equal, counties at the 90th percentile of 
Democratic share presidential vote ‘08 received between $35 and $36 more per capita in 
both total funding and infrastructure projects than did counties in the 10th percentile.” 
However, as noted by Boone (2014), “this differential is at least partly driven by a small 
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number of very dense urban districts with high levels of employment -- and the differential 
is smaller when the stimulus award was measured per worker in the district. Democratic 
districts did receive modestly greater funds, but this is largely due to higher levels of 
funding going to places with more generous state welfare programs.” 
As a point of study, the distribution of ARRA funds provided a unique glimpse into 
the effect of fiscal policy initiatives during a time of crisis. Recovery.gov provided 
transparency into the primary goal of the federal stimulus - to save jobs and create new 
ones - and allows for tracking at not only the city level, but to the neighborhood. And 
research has shown that the overall number of jobs created or saved and the multiplier 
effect from dollars expended nears if not exceeds two million jobs. Two government 
agencies and a third party verification suggest that total nonfarm sector jobs saved varies 
from 1.3 million to 2.8 million by the Congressional Budget Office to 2.2 million to 2.6 
million by the Council for Economic Advisors and an alternative methodology settles on 2.0 
million in 2010 and 3.4 million by early 2011, resulting in eight jobs per $1 million spent, or 
$125,000 per job (Wilson, 2012). 
Together, the existing literature on the effectiveness of the allocation and distribution 
of federal funds under ARRA have focused on national political coalitions and the 
effectiveness of public policy exercised on a grand scale. But the opportunity that the 
tracking of recipients of ARRA funds through recovery.gov allows for a more granular review 
of ARRA funds at the urban level, the distribution of funds as they relate to local political 




The method of study is a descriptive analysis of federal funding in Brooklyn from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 as originally tracked through the 
Recovery.gov site (Recovery, 2009) established by the federal government during the 
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allocation period of federal stimulus dollars to states and municipalities. Recovery.gov 
provided specific information on the types of grants or loans from the federal government to 
businesses and organizations operating in Brooklyn, which can further be identified by their 
associated Assembly District. Areas of specific interest are loans from the Small Business 
Administration; grants from the Energy and Education departments; and grants from 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Health and Human Services (HHS) 
departments.  
 The funds allocated by ARRA to Brooklyn entities are then mapped against the 
Assembly Districts, the smallest consistent measure of party voting that is tracked by the 
Department of Elections of New York City. The assembly districts can then be identified by 
pro-Mayor votes in 2009 as a relative change from 2005 to help indicate the drop-off in 
mayoral political support from the decision to extend term limits in October 2008. It also 
provides a baseline for coalitions that supported the reelection of Mayor Bloomberg in 2005 
and again in 2009, based on party politics, ethnic motivations, and other factors as 
identified in the regime politics literature. From there, the study provides a descriptive 
analysis of the allocation of federal funds from ARRA to certain individuals, businesses, and 
organizations within established areas of the electoral coalition for the mayor in 2009.  
 The study will compare those findings to the more recent electoral coalitions of 
Democratic mayoral candidate Bill de Blasio in the Democratic primary and general election 
in 2013. The shift in party politics from 2009 to 2013 demonstrates the emergence of 
different electoral coalitions than had been experienced by the city in the run of Republican-
elected officials from 1993 to 2013. It will also allow for an analysis of general funding from 
the federal government and its allocations by assembly district to see if any anomalies 
emerged from the unexpected and unprecedented allocation of federal funds to the city 
during the Great Recession as part of the federal stimulus package of 2009.  
 Further, the paper will review the recipients of federal funds in Brooklyn as 
distributed through programs allocated from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
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and compare them against recipients of discretionary funds from the City of New York in 
2009-2013. This comparison will help to identify the type and magnitude of investment in 
projects that might be deemed as “shovel ready” or otherwise unfunded except in the 
instance that the events of the Great Recession provided. In addition, the comparison will 
expose the prevalence of funding that was directed to businesses, organizations, or 
individuals that received funding from the discretionary budget in years to come. Finally, by 
tracking these funding instances against New York State assembly district, it can be 
determined if there is any correlation between funding and geographic political support.  
 
Recent history of political coalitions in New York (1993 to 2009) 
 
Over its history, New York City has seen the rise and tempering of political influences that 
drove electioneering and the establishment of strong political parties within the city 
(Mollenkopf, 1994; Strom & Mollenkopf, 2006). Unlike other major urban centers in the 
United States, New York City has experienced an unprecedented run of Republican 
candidates that dominated the mayor’s office from 1993 to 2013, first with two-term mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani from 1993-2001, and then with Michael Bloomberg from 2001-2013, being 
one of only four mayors to serve twelve years (LaGuardia, Wagner, Koch), and the first 
since referendums put before New York City residents limited terms of mayors to two (and 
which were quickly reestablished after his second reelection). 
The political coalitions that allowed Republican candidates to win in a city with 
registered Democrats outnumbering registered Republicans by as much as 7 to 1 is a study 
in electoral coalition building. The fracturing of the Democratic party coalitions across racial 
and economic lines as well as regional influences within the geographies managed by 
political machines in each borough help to understand the influences that led voters to elect 
and reelect candidates counter to the distribution of party representation that dominated 
the City Council and Assembly Districts within the city. 
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At the heart of political coalition building in New York City is its immigrant history 
and immigrant and ethnic political representation and mobilization. New York City has 
always been “a segmented political system, organized for mobilization around ethnic group 
lines, and a political culture that sanctions, indeed encourages, newcomers to engage in 
ethnic politics” (Waldinger, 1996). The role of immigrant and ethnic communities on the 
political landscape of New York City had not dulled in 2009 at the time of the Great 
Recession and the signing of ARRA into law. “At the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
immigrants from the Dominican Republic, China, Mexico, and Jamaica were the top four 
immigrant groups, but there were substantial numbers from other Latin American, Asian, 
and Caribbean countries as well as from Europe and, in recent years, from Africa, too. In 
fact, in 2010, the four largest groups were only a little over a third of all foreign born, and 
no other country accounted for more than 5 percent (Foner, 2014).” Or, as stated by 
Mollenkopf (2014), and quoted at length: 
 
Unlike Newark, Detroit, or St. Louis, New York City did not become more black 
- or even more native minority - as it became less white. Instead, it received a 
growing number of immigrants from all racial backgrounds. By 2009, whites 
remained a third of the city’s population, but mainly because immigrants from 
the Soviet Union bolstered the total. 
 In 2009, according to the Central Population Survey (CPS), some three 
million of New York City’s 8.3 million residents were foreign born and another 
two million were their children. People living in immigrant families made up 
almost three-fifths of the city’s residents, almost half its voting-age citizens, 
and two-fifths of its actual voters… The group that has long dominated New 
York City politics, native born whites with native parents, now make up less 
than one-fifth of the city’s population, although in 2008 they contributed a 
quarter of eligible voters and almost a third of those actually casting ballots. 
 This has made assembling a city-wide electoral majority ever more 
challenging. To be sure, racial polarization (whites versus nonwhites) has 
played an important role in all mayoral elections between 1989 and 2009. The 
overwhelming Democratic advantage in voter registration should have meant 
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that party allegiance would have enabled Democratic nominees to win citywide 
elections. In these mayoral races, however, enough white (and other) 
Democrats were willing to defect from Democratic candidates who were 
members of minority groups or received substantial support from them that 
Republican candidates won all the mayoral elections after the Dinkins victory in 
1989. Still, because native immigrant-origin white voters were no longer a 
majority of the electorate after 2000, white candidates could note use racial 
polarization as an effective strategy for assembling an electoral majority. 
Instead, they needed some cross-group coalition formation.  
 
Later in this paper, we will explore the coalitions that were present in 2009 as the Great 
Recession took hold and the shift in those political coalitions that led to the first election of a 
Democratic mayor in twenty years, as occurred with the election of Bill de Blasio in 2013. As 
part of that examination, the background from political coalition theory and urban regime 
politics will provide a good measure of observation, allowing a picture to be drawn of 
political coalitions present during the contentious mayoral election of 2009, amidst the 
political upheaval created by the extension of term limits not only for the mayor’s office but 
for city council members. The political environment stemming from this decision and 
reaffirmation of the two term limit in 2010 set the stage for the shifting political balance in 
2013 between centrist, party-backed candidates in the Democratic primary, and the rise of 
emerging candidates for the mayor’s office. These political events operated in the shadows 
of the Great Recession, and played out in specific form on the streets of Brooklyn, as 
neighborhoods shifted political allegiance, and new political coalitions were formed, at the 
same time that the greatest influx of unanticipated funding from the federal government 









Brooklyn provides a good measure of the distributive qualities of federal funding from ARRA 
and the potential influence of urban regime politics in New York City for a number of 
reasons. First, unlike Manhattan with its global financial institutions and international 
corporate centers that influence federal legislation, businesses and organizations in Brooklyn 
sought ARRA funding on much the same level-ground as other municipalities around the 
country. Brooklyn has no Wall Street, which not incidentally received its own federal bailout 
in 2008 and 2009, and no Midtown corporate service environment with lobbying arms that 
extend to Senate and House offices in Washington. In short, the competition begins on a 
more even plane and is subject to the political influences that compete at the neighborhood 
level. 
 Brooklyn has a history of Democratic politics built around neighborhood ethnic 
dynamics, traditional Democratic Party control, and the influence of a growing liberal 
Democratic constituency. In 2009, it had an emerging liberal/labor political arm in the 
Working Families Party and a traditional Democratic machine that, though weakened, still 
exerted great authority in sections of the borough. In time, that liberal/labor arm under the 
Working Families Party would emerge as a political force that helped to shape the 
constituency of Bill de Blasio’s run for mayor in 2013. Brooklyn also includes ethnic 
constituencies whose loyalties are sought-after in election years. The Jewish vote in 
Borough Park, Midwood, and Crown Heights, and the Hassidic communities in southern 
Williamsburg are often central to success in borough-wide elections. Brooklyn has an 
established and politically active African-American population in Fort Greene, Clinton Hill, 
and Bedford-Stuyvesant. It has a fast-growing population of Dominicans, Haitians, and 
other Caribbean ethnic groups emerging as a political force in Flatbush, Wingate, 
Brownsville, and East New York. A large Mexican-American population lives in Sunset Park, 
Red Hook, and a growing Latin population is developing in eastern portions of the borough. 
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Brooklyn also has established, if now more isolated, populations of conservative Democrats 
in white ethnic neighborhoods across the borough. Italian and Irish neighborhoods in Bay 
Ridge, Carroll Gardens, Bensonhurst, Kensington, and Gravesend hold traditional political 
power in the borough. White ethnics also comprise much of the recent immigrant population 
with communities of Russian and Eastern European immigrants in Brighton Beach, Coney 
Island, and Sheepshead Bay. Lastly, a politically active population of liberal Democrats 
centers the borough in Park Slope, Cobble Hill, and parts of Windsor Terrace. This ethnic 
heterogeneity and political influence centered within specific neighborhoods creates a 
competitive, and ever-shifting, political atmosphere in citywide and council elections. 
 
Mayoral electoral map: Brooklyn (pre-2009 to 2013) 
 
The electoral coalition that elected Michael Bloomberg in 2001 and 2005 stands in sharp 
contrast from the one that persisted through the controversial election of 2009. Bloomberg 
expended considerable amounts of his personal wealth to achieve the public-facing image 
that catapulted him from successful entrepreneur turned billionaire turned philanthropist 
into one of the most successful political runs in recent mayoral history in New York. His 
electoral coalition stretched out from Manhattan to the boroughs building on a responsive 
electorate in populations within Brooklyn that had helped to elect Republican after 
Republican mayor since 1993 from the end of the Dinkins administration to the onset of the 
Giuliani administration. In 2005, Bloomberg was reelected in the contest with Democrat 
Fernando Ferrer with key constituencies in Democratic-leaning Brooklyn coming to show 
their support for the Republican mayor. Traditionally Latino areas of Brooklyn came out to 
support the former Bronx borough president, Ferrer, who is of Puerto Rican descent, and 
Bloomberg struggled to win votes in areas like Sunset Park and Bushwick. Ferrer had lost 
the 2001 Democratic primary in part because he was not able to capture the black vote in 
Brooklyn, and in 2005, though Bloomberg was outpaced by Ferrer in black neighborhoods, 
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Bloomberg still pulled in surprising levels of support from predominately black communities, 
including Brownsville (41.4%), Bedford-Stuyvesant (42.3%), and the assembly districts 
covering Crown Heights, Clinton Hill, and Fort Greene (44.7%), though those areas were 
boosted by Jewish-American votes in those districts.  
 Bloomberg strongholds in Brooklyn in the 2005 election included the assembly 
districts that covered areas with large white ethnic populations, Democrats that often fled 
the party for Republicans when ethnic minorities were nominated in the Democratic 
primary, areas like Gravesend (83.6%), Coney Island, Brighton Beach, and Bath Beach 
(73.7%), and Bensonhurst (77.1%). More so, Bloomberg established a base in Jewish 
neighborhoods throughout Brooklyn seeing strong support in Borough Park (78.7%), 
Midwood (84.6%), and Jewish sections of Williamsburg.  
 The picture for Bloomberg in Brooklyn changed considerably in 2009, facing not only 
resentment from the change in term limits but also a new opponent, comptroller Bill 
Thompson. Thompson, an African American, had appeal in the borough that diluted any 
support that Bloomberg had in traditionally black neighborhoods in the city. Bloomberg 
faced a precipitous fall in support in key areas like Brownsville - falling from 41.4% to 
15.4% of the vote; Bedford-Stuyvesant - from 42.3% to 15.7%; Crown Heights, Clinton 
Hill, Fort Greene - from 44.7% to 23.3%; and in Flatbush/East Flatbush - from 50.1% to 
18.7%. Bloomberg also saw a decline in white liberal neighborhoods like Park Slope and 
Prospect Heights. But in key areas of the borough, the Bloomberg election coalition held, 
specifically in Jewish-American areas and the white ethnic neighborhoods, including 
Gravesend (81.0%), Bensonhurst (73.7%), Midwood (72.6%), parts of Borough Park 












2005 (by AD) 
  
Vote-Mayor-
2009 (by AD) 
40   45.10%   22.60% 
41 Marine Park 68.70%   52.80% 
42 Flatbush 52.20%   32.60% 
43 Flatbush, Crown Heights 51.70%   23.60% 
44 Park Slope, Prospect Heights 62.60%   54.90% 
45 Gravesend 83.60%   81.00% 
46 
Coney Island, Brighton Beach, Bath 
Beach 
73.70%   69.20% 
47 Bensonhurst 77.10%   73.70% 
48 Midwood 84.60%   72.60% 
49 Borough Park 78.70%   69.90% 
50 Williamsburg 59.00%   44.00% 
51 Sunset Park 39.60%   45.90% 
52 Downtown Brooklyn 58.90%   54.00% 
53 Bushwick 26.40%   40.00% 
54 Cypress Hills 32.40%   26.30% 
55 Brownsville 41.40%   15.40% 
56 Bedford-Stuyvesant 42.30%   15.70% 
57 Crown Heights, Clinton Hill, Fort Greene 44.70%   23.30% 
58 Flatbush, East Flatbush 50.10%   18.70% 
59 Marine Park 69.80%   48.30% 
60 East New York/Howard Beach 74.60%   65.70% 
All Brooklyn   58.20%   45.10% 
(NYC Board of Elections, 2005, 2009) 
 
The Bloomberg political coalition - or more pointedly, one that had extended from 2001 to 
2009, a coalition supported by white ethnics, featuring particularly strong support in Jewish 
neighborhoods, as well as Italian and Irish sections of the city - had weakened with the 
effort to extend term limits. The weakened areas of the coalition, specifically among white 
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liberals and the evaporation of support from traditionally black neighborhoods, set up the 
potential for the Democrats to regain Gracie Mansion in the following election.  
 The early years of the recovery from the Great Recession were not ones of political 
triumph for Bloomberg and no Republican successor was to be crowned. Groups most 
affected by the recession, be it those employed in manufacturing and other blue-collar 
professions, to those that saw the promise of home ownership disappear in neighborhoods 
that only ten years earlier had seen the first generation, often a first generation of 
Americans, establish themselves as property owners in heavily immigrant and emerging 
neighborhoods of Brooklyn.  
 Not since Dinkins won in 1989 had there been as much optimism for the Democratic 
Party to capture the mayor’s office with a progressive candidate. Emerging in the 
Democratic primary of 2013 were Christine Quinn, council speaker; Bill Thompson, looking 
to rebound from his loss to Bloomberg in 2009; John Lui, the rising star in Queens; and Bill 
de Blasio, public advocate and darling of the Working Families Party that was making a 
major push to support left-leaning candidates who would challenge machine candidates tied 
to borough establishment politics.  
 Brooklyn was home turf for de Blasio - Quinn was established in Manhattan; Lui in 
Queens - the biggest threat to de Blasio, after Anthony Weiner had left the contest under 
controversy, was Bill Thompson, and the threat to an electoral coalition that needed support 
in black constituencies across the borough. Ultimately, de Blasio would only win Brooklyn 
with 46.4% of the primary vote, but go-on to win the borough in the general election with 
77.5% of the vote, outpacing Bloomberg’s performance in 2009 by 32%. Where Bloomberg 
saw the largest fall-off in support in Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Crown Heights 
and Flatbush, de Blasio was able to hold off Thompson by an average of 50% to 33% in key 
areas of his electoral base (NYC Board of Elections, 2013). The Bloomberg strongholds of 
2009, particularly in the Jewish neighborhoods of Borough Park, parts of Williamsburg, and 
in white ethnic areas in Bensonhurst, Midwood, Coney Island, and Gravesend did not 
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migrate to de Blasio, and instead set aside Thompson, who they had passed on in 2009, to 
either split the vote or shift in favor of John Lui, the only areas of Brooklyn in which de 
Blasio was not able to maintain a plurality of the vote in the primary.  
 



















41 Marine Park 52.80% 38.10% 31.8% BT   58.50% 
42 Flatbush 32.60% 50.10% 29.3% BT   84.60% 
43 Flatbush, Crown Heights 23.60% 50.10% 32.5% BT   92.90% 
44 Park Slope, Prospect Heights 54.90% 57.00% 16.2% CQ   73.50% 
45 Gravesend 81.00% 25.80% 22.2% BT   36.20% 
46 
Coney Island, Brighton Beach, 
Bath Beach 
69.20% 35.40% 23.8% BT   48.50% 
47 Bensonhurst 73.70% 25.60% 31.9% JL   52.10% 
48 Midwood 72.60% 38.00% 34.0% BT   39.10% 
49 Borough Park 69.90% 26.90% 36.9% JL   54.50% 
50 Williamsburg 44.00% 45.20% 38.4% BT   79.00% 
51 Sunset Park 45.90% 48.20% 16.6% BT   80.80% 
52 Downtown Brooklyn 54.00% 56.60% 26.2% CQ   80.30% 
53 Bushwick 40.00% 31.80% 25.8% BT   90.80% 
54 Cypress Hills 26.30% 35.80% 34.7% BT   94.70% 
55 Brownsville 15.40% 43.90% 34.5% BT   97.50% 
56 Bedford-Stuyvesant 15.70% 45.30% 37.2% BT   97.00% 
57 
Crown Heights, Clinton Hill, 
Fort Greene 
23.30% 54.70% 24.1% BT   94.50% 
58 Flatbush, East Flatbush 18.70% 52.40% 33.0% BT   97.80% 
59 Marine Park 48.30% 45.60% 33.5% BT   75.10% 
60 East New York/Howard Beach 65.70% 46.70% 34.0% BT   96.50% 
64 Bay Ridge   36.00% 21.7% CQ   49.00% 
All 
Brooklyn 
  45.10% 46.40% n/a   77.50% 




The general election in 2013 reestablished a Democratic coalition that fell along more 
traditional lines, or at least more traditional in terms of expectations prior to the 
unprecedented run of Republican mayors from 1993 to 2013. In Brooklyn, de Blasio saw 
massive swings in traditionally black and immigrant neighborhoods where he had already 
out-paced Thompson in the primary. Throughout Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Crown 
Heights, Flatbush and East Flatbush, de Blasio received greater than 90% and in many 
cases greater than 95% of the general election vote. Specific to de Blasio’s success was the 
support from the electorate aligned to the Working Families Party line, a line and political 
effort that had originally propelled him into the public advocate’s office. The Working 
Families Party line accounted for 5.1% of his votes in Brooklyn, but were instrumental in 
key geographic strongholds in Park Slope/Prospect Heights (11.2%), downtown Brooklyn 
(12.9%), and Clinton Hill/Fort Greene (9.6%), and labor-backing centers in Sunset Park and 
Williamsburg (NYC Board of Elections, 2013). Only traditionally native white ethnic 
communities, fueled by more conservative Italian, Irish and Jewish communities, held out in 
what was otherwise a dominating electoral outcome in the borough for the Democratic 
candidate.   
 
The economic climate and federal funding in the New York City budget (2001-
2008) 
 
The Great Recession and the economic stimulus funding that followed provides a 
unique moment in the history of federal funding in the city. Functioning under the political 
landscape of New York City is the largest economic center by concentration in the United 
States with an annual budget that exceeds the budgets of all but five states. From 2009 to 
2018, the New York City budget grew from $59.373 billion to $85.239 billion and federal 
funding grew from just over $5 billion before the Great Recession to $7.8 billion in 2018. 
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The influx of money in 2009, on the heels of the economic disaster that became the Great 
Recession, saw an immediate rise in federal funding as a percentage of the total city budget 
that was unprecedented in recent history. The result was a rise in federal funding in FY 2010 
that was $2.630 billion more than the estimated total of funding from the federal 
government, a 49.5% increase over expectations.  (Thompson, 2008; Liu, 2010; Stringer, 
2017).   
The federal stimulus, much like the Great Recession, was unanticipated as part of the 
original budget and forecasting efforts by the city. Bill Thompson, NYC comptroller in 2008, 
reported in his office’s annual executive summary that, “the adopted budget for FY 2008 
and FYs 2008-2011 Financial Plan reflect the benefits of the City economy’s strong 
performance and prudent fiscal management.” The only hint of concern: “While we agree 
with the City that that local economic growth will follow the lead of the slowing national 
economy, the Comptroller’s Office expects that the local housing market will not soften as 
much as the City’s forecast suggests [a prediction that did not stand the test of time, as 
noted in Chart 1]… One note of caution surrounding higher revenues is concern that 
stresses to the credit and equity markets emanating from problems with sub-prime loans 
could intensify and decrease Wall Street profits” (Thompson, 2008). Perhaps because of 
these tepid warnings, no change was made to the forecast for federal funding for years 
2008-2011, remaining steady at $5.2 billion to $5.3 billion annually in each year between 






The 2009 report, again by Comptroller Thompson, sheds some (but not all) of the 
optimism for New York City to weather the economic storm that was brewing across the 
nation. “In the midst of the weak and uncertain local and national economies… Although the 
Comptroller does not expect the present slowdown to be as disastrous for New York City’s 
workforce as were the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions… the economic projections of the 
Comptroller’s Office are less pessimistic than those of the Executive Budget…” (Thompson, 
2009). Projections for federal funds for NYC remained unchanged in the 2009 annual report, 
holding steady at $5.3 billion per year for the entire forecast. 
 By the time John Liu had become Comptroller, the forecast had changed considerably 
as had the tone: “A year ago at this time, the U.S. economy was in the midst of one of its 
steepest contractions since WWII and there was little certainty of where the bottom would 
be found. Since then, however, the outlook has improved considerably, thanks to 
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unprecedented actions by the federal government and the natural resiliency of the American 
economy… A significant portion of the Federal grants assumption represents stimulus 
funding that the City expects to receive under ARRA of 2009.” One need only look at the 
federal funds support for the Department of Education (DOE) to see the baseline effect – in 
FY 2010, federal funding accounted for $1.194 billion of the NYC DOE budget, another 
projected $853 million in FY2011, before falling off completely as ARRA funding ran its 
course.  
 
Table 1.3 | ARRA Federal Stimulus Funds, Projections FYs 2009-2013 
($ in millions) 












Community Development $0  $48  $0  $0  $0  $48  
Education 0 1,194 853 0 0 $2,047  
Health and Social Services 28 207 39 0 0 $274  
Neighborhood Stabilization 47 72 21 5 0 $145  
Economic/Workforce Development 1 60 4 0 0 $65  
Build America/NYCTFA Bonds 0 16 62 64 64 $206  
Other 0 68 90 25 7 $190  
Total Expense Budget Support $75  $1,665  $1,070  $94  $71  $2,975  
FMAP Medicaid Relief $459  $663  $856  $395  $422  $2,795  
Total ARRA Support $534  $2,328  $1,926  $489  $493  $5,770  
(Lui, 2011)       
  
 In this time, federal funding forecasts shifted dramatically to $8.193 billion in FY 
2010 and a projected $6.691 billion in FY 2011 before returning to more traditional 
baselines of previous budget forecasts. These shifts reflect an increase of funding from the 







Table 1.4 | Comptroller Estimated Federal Categorical Grants, FYs 2009 - 2013 












Thompson, 2008 $5,380  $5,364  $5,351      
Thompson, 2009 $5,395  $5,313  $5,303  $5,313    
Lui, 2011   $8,193  $6,691  $5,690  $5,640  
            
Difference Projection '08 to '09 0.28% -0.95% -0.90%     
Difference Projection '09 to '11   54.21% 26.17% 7.10%   
            
(Thompson, 2008; Thompson, 2009; Lui, 2011)     
  
The unprecedented increase in federal funding served to offset key losses from tax revenues 
and state contributions to the city budget. But those grants were not the only means of 
funding that reached Brooklyn. As we will see in the next section, the Small Business 
Administration also provided grants and loans to individuals, businesses, and organizations, 
which no longer had access to traditional credit markets in the wake of the Recession.   
 
The distribution of ARRA federal funds in Brooklyn, NY 
 
ARRA funds came into Brooklyn in the forms of Loans, Grants, and Contracts. Each took an 
important role in an economic recovery, and each served a different political capacity.  
 
Loans, Small Business Administration 
Loans, administered almost exclusively by the Small Business Administration, provided 
access to credit that was otherwise unavailable as credit granting financial institutions 
closed or moved to a protectionist position. Loans, ranging from aid to small businesses 
($10,000 - $50,000) to more lucrative long-term financing ($150,000 - $1,000,000+), 
entered the borough but provided little in contributed capital that aligned with the political 
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coalitions competing for Brooklyn. Examples of larger loans in the borough include the 
following. 
 
TABLE 1.5 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Large Loans  
Recipient Neighborhood 
Assembly Member/ Council 
Member 
Funding ($) 
Clairion Inn & Suites Park Slope Millman/de Blasio $1,539,000  
New York Glass, Co. Sunset Park Ortiz/Gonzalez $1,500,000  
Midwood Dialysis, LLC Midwood Brennan/Felder $1,350,000  
Hi-Rite Electric Corp. Bay Ridge Ortiz/Gentile $989,000  
(Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov) 
 
Of greater importance are the number of grants that were issued to organizations within in 
the borough. Grants came from a variety of agencies in the administration, including the 
Education Department, the Energy Department, Housing and Urban Development, Health 
and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and smaller grants from the National Endowment for 
the Arts. The grants ranged in purpose: educational grant programs, low-income housing 
funds, capital construction projects in the health services industry, and job retention funds 
as part of the Obama administration’s efforts to “save or create” jobs in the failing 
economy. 
 
Grants, Education and Energy Departments 
The vast majority of education department grants (and energy department grants 
promoting energy efficiency) in Brooklyn went to two sources: major universities or colleges 
and Jewish schools and community centers. The private colleges and for-profit universities 
in Brooklyn received a number of significant funds for capital improvements and other 









Long Island University Hospital Downtown Brooklyn Millman/de Blasio $377,349  
St. Francis College Downtown Brooklyn Millman/Yassky $1,137,739  
Brooklyn Law College Downtown Brooklyn Millman/Yassky $209,571  
Pratt Institute Clinton Hill Jeffries/James $1,206,588  
St. Joseph's College Clinton Hill Jeffries/James $1,436,921  
ASA Institute of Business Downtown Brooklyn Millman/Yassky $6,068,451  
 (Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov) 
 
Additionally, Jewish schools received an unexpectedly large number of federal grants for 
schools across Bloomberg strongholds in Borough Park, Midwood, Williamsburg and parts of 
Flatbush. Also noteworthy, no other faith-based schools received ARRA funding in Brooklyn 
as reported on recovery.gov, including no direct funding to the Roman Catholic, Eastern or 
Russian Orthodox dioceses of Brooklyn (exception: ARRA funding directed to Catholic 
colleges & universities noted above), Muslim madrassas, or Protestant-affiliated schools. 
Distribution of federal funds do not have a direct line from Gracie Mansion, but the number 
of Jewish community centers and schools that received funding maps against the 
concentration of political power for Mayor Bloomberg during the 2009 election.  The collapse 
of support for Bloomberg in black and white liberal areas of the borough required his 
campaign to maximize the potential from key constituencies that remained part of his 
coalition, none perhaps more important than the Jewish communities that were served by 
the community centers receiving a substantial portion of ARRA funds in the borough. 
 






Table 1.7 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Jewish Community 







Crown Heights Jewish Center Crown Heights Jeffries/James $4,004,547  
Mestiva Torah Vodaath Seminary Park Slope Brennan/de Blasio $94,137  
Mirrer Yeshiva Center Sheepshead Bay Cymbrowitz/Nelson $178,543  
Beth Hatalmud Rabbinical Bensonhurst Colton/Recchia $249,543  
Merkaz BNOS Bensonhurst Colton/Recchia $673,637  
Mesitva of Eastern Parkway East Flatbush Perry/Mealy $34,077  
Associated Beth Rivkan Crown Heights Camara/James $140,000  
Rabbinical College  Bedford-Stuyvesant Robinson/Vann $407,681  
Yeshiva Kehilath Yakoe Williamsburg Lentol/Yassky $49,451  
Khal Beni Emunim Talmud Williamsburg Lentol/Yassky $527,916  
Kehilath Ykov Rabinnical Sem Williamsburg Lentol/Yassky $138,151  
United Talmudical Academy Williamsburg Lentol/Yassky $1,959,169  
Congregation Adas Yereim Williamsburg Lentol/Yassky $68,695  
Yeshiva of Nitra Williamsburg Lentol/Yassky $367,363  
(Recovery.gov; USASpending.gov) 
 
Grants, Housing & Urban Development and Health & Human Services Grants 
The federal grants through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and 
Health and Human Services (HHS) came largely through Community Development Block 
Grants administered within neighborhoods. In contrast to the flow of money to Jewish 
schools and community centers, often relatively smaller sums directed at political forces 
with smaller, finite geographical influence, the block grants served through large community 
organizations played a different political role. These grants were received by organizations 
like Ridgewood-Bushwick, once purveyor of the politics of Vito Lopez, Brooklyn Democratic 
Party boss.  
The larger community development organizations exercised a political aim, reinforcing 
the notion that funding streams entered the borough from the federal government both to 
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constituencies in favor of Bloomberg’s reelection and to those that had shifted support to 
Thompson. Examples of ARRA funds flowing into these organizations include the following. 
 
Table 1.8 | ARRA Funding Recipients in Brooklyn: Community Development Organizations 
Recipient Federal Agency Funding ($) 
Ridgewood-Bushwick Senior Citizens Council HUD $1,566,747  
Kingston Ave Development LLC HUD $2,092,818  
Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corp HUD $8,838,955  
Classon Heights LLC HUD $1,573,200  
Bushwick Avenue Associates HUD $366,000  
ODA Community Development Corp HUD $10,215,781  
Brooklyn Chinese American Association HUD $431,129  
Sunset Park Health Center HUD $3,566,526  
Mother Zion Apartments HUD $1,083,225  
Towne Gardens LLC HUD $1,987,456  
Brownsville Community Development HUD $1,079,672  
Greene Ave HDFC HUD $1,591,031  
Bedford-Stuyvesant Health Center HUD $1,112,200  
Camba HUD $5,689,000  




This is not to suggest a causal relationship between HUD grants and political organizations 
with a political end. Indeed, many of these bring federal dollars to community development 
and low-income housing projects drastically in need of funding. However, these public 
housing initiatives have a political element to them that cannot be mistaken. Funding for 
these institutions has political consequences and additional funding from the federal 




Shovel-Ready or Rent-Seeking: Uniqueness and Success Measures of Recipient 
Beneficiaries of Federal Funds under ARRA 
 
Ultimately, ARRA will be measured on its achievement of its policy goals: namely, to 
preserve and create jobs. To that end, the question of whether program recipients fit the 
description of “shovel-ready” – recipients that would utilize federal investment (either grant 
or loans) to create demand through increased production, innovation, or consumption – 
requires additional analysis. If Kingdon’s measure prevails, political entrepreneurs would 
have succeeded in diverting federal funds towards a “rent-seeking” model fueling political 
gamesmanship more than economic growth.  
 One measure of the uniqueness of ARRA funding is reflected in the number of 
businesses that received ARRA funds but were not part of discretionary funding after ARRA 
was fully distributed. Essentially, were recipients common receivers of federal funds, or 
were they unique to funding from the discretionary budget controlled by the city? Of the 
ninety-one (91) business and organizations that this study addresses, twenty (20) were 
recipients of discretionary funds from the city after 2009. The character of those twenty 
recipients is worth examining. Essentially, four categories of recipients prevailed with 
additional funding in the years after ARRA, large public/private institutions, community-
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The majority of the recipients of federal funds were not repeat receivers and provided a 
spectrum of available recipients from dry cleaners to restauranteurs, start-ups, and well-
established programs. The term “shovel-ready” leaves a lot to be desired from a policy 
point-of-view – do established businesses have more infrastructure to take advantage of 
new funding to convert it into job-creating or job-saving investments; or, do established 
businesses seek federal funds to service debt at low rates? Are entrepreneurs who took 
advantage of federal funding under ARRA good bets for the economy or unnecessary risks 
that won’t contribute to the economy once the funding dries up?  
 A look at the recipients of ARRA funds in Brooklyn based on their years of 
establishment provides another view into how funds were distributed to businesses and 
organizations within the borough (via Dun & Bradstreet Business Browser and Resource USA 
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databases). The stimulus reached institutions established as early as 1884 (St. Francis 
College) and 1887 (Pratt Institute) and 1897 (Brooklyn Public Library). It reached small 
business established after the Great Recession in 2008 (A to Z Daycare) and 2010 (Citywide 
Dental) that used small business loans to establish their business. The measure of success 
of ARRA cannot be limited to a view of 2009, but must take into account the funding that 
allowed businesses to establish themselves in the years that followed. Overall, as examined 
through the Dun & Bradstreet and Resource USA databases, fifty-one (51) of the ninety-one 
(91) recipients were registered in their databases with information showing a range of 
receivers from post-2007 (10), 2000-2006 (7), 1990-1999 (12), 1950-1989 (14), and pre-
1949 (10). This range of recipients suggests that distribution was driven by business 
entrepreneurs and established institutions experienced at seeking funding sources from the 
federal government.  
 Lastly, performance of ARRA recipients has not lived up to the transparency that was 
promised in the original legislation. The website, recovery.gov, was shut down, replaced in 
part by USAspending.gov, but which still did not list whether loan-recipients had repaid their 
loans. Economic performance tracks some indicators but provides an incomplete picture: 
economic/business databases show some signs of progress, but are inconclusive, as self-
reported data into each database is difficult to confirm with secondary evidence. 
Nonetheless, the data available show a picture of progress and the limitations that a single 
moment of funding can have on small business development in a competitive marketplace 
like New York City. 
 Companies that reported growth from 2009 to 2018 through Resources USA included 
ARRA recipients like Hi-Rite Electric (9.7% increase in net revenue), Maximum Security 
Systems (90.3%), Lee Trading Company (75.3%), and Volmar Construction (12.5%), but in 
every case the revenue increases were outside the years 2009-2011, and therefore provide 
less evidence of correlation between ARRA funding and increased revenue. Did ARRA bridge 
a troubled time? Did ARRA allow for the business that otherwise might have closed to 
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remain open? Certainly that is possible, but being that much of the revenue gains appear 
later, it appears that ARRA was more effective in its mission to save jobs than to create 
jobs.  
 At the same time, a number of businesses fell-off in revenue in the years after ARRA 
funding, namely NYC Glass (-54.7%), JEM Smoke (-79.8%), Lugh Studios (-39.3%), and 
Soltone, Inc. (-71.6%), the restaurant company having used the federal loan to open a 
second restaurant location in Park Slope that would close not long after opening. Perhaps 
revealing, according to each database, two of the companies that started after the 
Recession saw declines in revenue after 2011, A to Z Daycare and Citywide Dental, though 
the declines were not precipitous.  
 
Overlays of federal funding and electoral coalition strength 
 
The overlay of federal funding against the diminishing electoral coalition of Michael 
Bloomberg’s candidacy in Brooklyn in 2009 does not present a causal relationship between 
federal funding and his electoral coalition. However, certain patterns do appear, namely, 
more so than others, the nexus of his campaign’s reliance on Jewish support from the 
borough as he anticipated a precipitous drop in support in neighborhoods that didn’t align to 
Fernando Ferrer in 2005, but were likely to support Bill Thompson in 2009. Furthermore, as 
few of those key recipients went on to receive discretionary funding from the city in the 
years after ARRA, those one-time allocations to key recipients in election constituencies 
further support the correlation of funding with much-needed political support. Lastly, the 
nature of the recipients, community centers and schools that have broad influence on their 
communities, especially noting that community centers of other faiths did not have the 
same representation, further indicates that political motivations, however consequential, 
were realized in the benefit of federal funds being directed to key elements of the 





The Great Recession, the federal government’s response with the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the coinciding election of Michael Bloomberg to a third term 
as mayor presented a unique moment to examine a major city at the crossroads of 
economic disaster and political upheaval.  
The Great Recession reached every part of the nation’s economy and no city, not 
even the epicenter of the American economy in New York City, was spared. Though the city 
weathered the economic shock of the Recession differently than other locations, aspects of 
the effects that reached the city are both representative of those that affected regions 
elsewhere and provided a unique view into how economic factors affect a city in political 
flux. New York City’s immigrant and ethnic-based politics posed an opportunity to examine 
how the effect of economic disaster and political change reach and breach political coalitions 
across the city.  
 Ultimately, this study looks to contribute to the developing literature on the 
expenditure of ARRA funds during the Great Recession. Unlike other research that has either 
focused on national distribution of ARRA funds (Benjamin, 2017), implementation 
constraints (Carley & Hyman, 2014), or the adherence of distribution to politically consistent 
aims (Young & Sobel, 2013), the work developed in this study is more consistent with the 
questions developed by Gimpel (2012), asking whether ARRA became “a vehicle for a broad 
array of policy goals as political entrepreneurs took advantage of an especially wide-open 
window of opportunity.” The analysis suggests the conditions were not only present but the 
allocation of funds consistent and aligned to key constituencies in Bloomberg’s reelection 
efforts in the tumultuous campaign of 2009. To that end, this study contributes to existent 
literature on ARRA by linking ARRA policy studies with the literature on urban political 
coalitions, to examine at the local, even the neighborhood level, how public budgeting under 
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extraordinary times play out during elections years, few as exceptional as the race for New 
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